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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 981545-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

ANDREW HALES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant directly appeals from his unconditional guilty pleas to three counts of
forgery, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1998), and
from his conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of methamphetamine, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (1998). This Court has
jurisdiction over appeals from third degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Did defendant waive his claim that he did not make a knowing and valid
waiver of his right to counsel before entering his guilty pleas where he did not condition any
of his pleas on that claim?
Standard of Review: Because defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal,
there is no trial court ruling to review.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No applicable constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules govern this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State charged defendant in a December 8, 1997 information with seven counts
of forgery, a third degree felony (R.2161:19-25).1 In a separate information filed December
22,1997, the State charged defendant with one count of possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and one count of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor (R.2382:01-02).

!

This appeal is from two district court cases, No. 971902161 and No. 971902382,
that have been consolidated for purposes of appeal (see Addendum A). Because there are
two district court pleadings file, one for each case, citations to the pleadings file will refer
to the last four digits of the applicable district court number, followed by the internal
record cite, e.g., R.2161:19. Similarly, citations to the transcripts will refer to the record
number stamped on the cover page, followed by the internal page number, e.g., R. 134:16.

2

At defendant's initial appearance on the forgery charges, the trial court appointed the
Public Defenders Association of Weber County ("PDA") to represent him (R.2161:39-41).
The court read defendant the information and advised him of his rights and the potential
penalties for the forgery charges (R.2161:40-41). A week later, defendant waived his right
to a preliminary hearing on the forgery charges (R2161:41-42;R. 134:4-5). Defense counsel
informed the court that he believed they would be able to negotiate a plea agreement on the
forgery charges, and asked for a one week continuance to prepare "the paperwork" (R. 134:4).
Defense counsel also asked that the forgery case be combined with the drug case (R.2161:4142;R.134:7-8).
The court also appointed PDA to represent defendant on the drug charges (R.2382:7).
At defendant's first appearance on the drug charges, the trial court read the information and
advised defendant of the charges and possible penalties (R.2382:7). After a preliminary
hearing on January 14, 1998, the court bound defendant over on both drug charges
(R.2382.9). The court again read the information to defendant and advised him of his rights
and the possible penalties (R.2382:10).
Subsequent pretrial and dispositional hearings on both the forgery and drug charges
were continued several times at the request of one or both parties (R.2382:85, 89, 108;
R.2161:42, 50, 53, 58, 59,60,61,74,79; R.134:l 1). On February 18,1998, defendant filed
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a pro se 120-day disposition request on the drug charges (R.2382:104).2 Defendant filed the
same pro se request in the forgery cases on April 14, 1998 (R.2161:65).
On May 13,1998, the State filed a second information adding 18 new forgery charges
to the original seven, making a total of 25 forgery counts (R.2161:1-18). The court read the
additional charges to defendant and explained that each of the forgery counts was punishable
by a maximum fine of $5,000 and zero-to-five years in prison (R. 134:14). Defendant stated
that he understood the charges (id).
After a preliminary hearing on the second information, the trial court bound defendant
over for trial on the new forgery counts (R.2161:87-89;R. 134:32). The court again read the
additional counts to defendant and he pled not guilty (R.2161:90-92;R.134:13-14).
At a pretrial conference on June 17, 1998, for both the drug and forgery charges,
defendant's attorney informed the court that defendant wanted to represent himself
(R.2161:98;R.2382:123;R.134:37-38). Defense counsel explained thathe and defendant had
a serious disagreement when defendant changed his mind about accepting a plea agreement
that his counsel had negotiated with the State (R. 134:37-38). Defendant confirmed this and
informed the court that he wanted to represent himself (R. 134:39).

2

This request was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1995), which
provides that a prisoner with pending charges may demand that the charge be brought to
trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. Subsection (4) provides
that if the prosecutor, without good cause, fails to have the matter heard within the
required time, the case must be dismissed with prejudice.
4

The trial court engaged defendant in a colloquy in which the court fully advised
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation (R. 134:39-44). (A
transcript of this hearing is reproduced in Addendum B). The court first ascertained that
defendant had received a "GED high school diploma," but that he had never before
represented himself in a legal proceeding (R. 134:39). Defense counsel, however, interjected
that he and defendant had talked several times and had discussed "different aspects" of case
law and statutes that defendant had brought to counsel (R. 134:39-40). Defense counsel also
pointed out that defendant had filed a 120-day disposition notice on his own (R. 134:40).
Counsel was "impressed with [defendant's] level of intelligence and his ability to discuss
these things intelligently and have a grasp of the issues" (R. 134:40). Counsel reiterated that
the only problem between him and his client was that they did not "see eye to eye on the
strength and relative abilities as far as the State's, strength of the State's case" (R. 134:40).
The trial court then advised defendant that "there are certain dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation," specifically that defendant was not trained in the law
and that there might be "procedural matters, strategic matters and legal matters with which
[defendant] might not be cognizant of or quite frankly oblivious of or not be aware o f
(R.134:41-42). The court also explained that defendant would be held to the same standard
as an attorney (R. 134:42). Defendant stated that he understood this (R. 134:42).
Defense counsel added that the prosecutor had informed him that more forgery
charges, in addition to the 25 already filed, could be filed if a plea agreement could not be
5

charges (R. 135:76).

In exchange, the State would dismiss the possession of drug

paraphernalia charge and the remaining 22 forgery counts (R. 135:76-78). Boyle explained
that the State also agreed to not bring any additional forgery counts for any incidents that the
State was aware of at the time and that the State would recommend that any prison terms be
imposed concurrently (R. 135:76-77).
The court then asked defendant, "You've gone over this with your attorney, Mr.
Hales, and this is what you've decided to do?" (R. 135:79). The defendant answered
affirmatively (R. 135:79). After engaging in a thorough colloquy as required by rule 1 l,Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court took defendant's conditional guilty plea to one count
of possession of a controlled substance and his unconditional pleas to three counts of forgery
(R. 135:79-86). The court also informed defendant that he had only thirty days in which to
file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 135:82).
The court sentenced defendant to four concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years
(R.2382:135-36;R.2161:116-18). Defendant was given credit for time served and ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $2,317.79 (id.). A public defender was present at the
sentencing hearing (R.23 82:135 ;R.2161:116).
Defendant, through counsel, filed two notices of appeal, one from the drug conviction
and one from the forgery convictions (R.23 82:138;R.2161:121). At defendant's request both
appeals were consolidated for purposes of appeal (see Addendum A).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that he did not make a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel. Defendant waived this non-jurisdictional claim of a pre-plea
constitutional violation when he entered his voluntary guilty pleas without making them
conditional on the preservation of this issue. Moreover, defendant's challenge to his pleas
is not properly before the court because he has never moved to withdraw them. Even if
defendant's claim were properly before the Court, it fails because it is not supported by the
record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT HE WAS
DEPRIVED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN HE
ENTERED HIS VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEAS
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel when the trial court allowed him to proceed pro se for a period prior
to entry of his guilty pleas. Defendant asserts, in effect, that his waiver of counsel was
invalid because the trial court did not ascertain that he comprehended the nature of the
charges and proceedings and the range of permissible punishments. Brief of Appellant
[hereinafter '*Br. Aplt."] at 6-7. Defendant waived that claim when he entered his guilty
pleas without conditioning them on the right to challenge the validity of his prior waiver of
counsel.
9

A. Defendant waived his claim.
As a general rule, *4a voluntary [and unconditional] guilty plea is a waiver of the right
to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including pre-plea constitutional violations." State v.
Jennings, 875 P.2d 566,567 n.l (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,
1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,938 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Penman, 964
P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah App.
1994); State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah App. 1992); State ex rel E.G.T., 808 P.2d
138,138-39 (Utah App. 1991) (per curiam). Once a defendant has admitted his factual guilt
by pleading guilty, *" [h]e may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty
plea.'" Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1277-78 (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 158, 267, 93
S.Ct. 1602, 1608(1973)).
An exception to this general rule exists when the plea entered by the defendant, with
the consent of the prosecution and accepted by the trial court, specifically preserves an issue
for appeal and allows withdrawal of the plea if defendant prevails on appeal. Sery, 758 P.2d
at 938-39; State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,1271 (Utah App. 1990); see Smith, 833 P.2d at 372.
Here, defendant specifically conditioned his plea to the possession of a controlled
substance charge on the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his pro se motion to dismiss
for failure to bring his case to disposition within 120 days (R. 135:79-86). Defendant,
however, does not raise that issue in his brief; he asserts only that he did not knowingly

10

waive his right to counsel. Br. Aplt. 6-7. Defendant's other three pleas were unconditional
(R. 135:79-86).
Defendant does not challenge the validity of his pleas, that is, their knowing and
voluntary character. He complains only that he was denied a nonjurisdictional constitutional
right to counsel before he entered his pleas. See E.G.T., 808 P.2d at 140 (holding that denial
of juvenile's right to counsel in juvenile court certification proceedings was waivable, and
therefore nonjurisdictional; juvenile's subsequent voluntary and unconditional guilty plea in
district court mooted his constitutional claim). Accordingly, defendant waived his claim that
he was denied the assistance of counsel by entering voluntary guilty pleas that were not
conditioned on the right to appeal this issue.
Moreover, defendant's claim is not properly before this Court because he has never
filed a motion to withdraw his pleas. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064,1067 (Utah 1993)
(declining to review defendant's attack on validity of his guilty pleas where he had never
moved to withdraw them). Utah law does not permit a defendant to directly attack an
unconditional guilty plea on appeal. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 343, 344-45 (Utah
App. 1988); see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067. Rather, a defendant must first file a motion
to withdraw the plea, thereby allowing the trial court an opportunity to consider the merits
of the defendant's arguments and to correct any error.4 Summers, 759 P.2d at 344-45;

4

Clearly, defendant could have appealed from his plea to the drug charge on the
issue of the failure to bring that case to disposition within 120 days because that plea was
11

Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067; see also State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-12 (Utah 1987).
The defendant may then appeal the denial of the motion to withdraw. Summers, 759 P.2d
at 344-45. A defendant may not attack his unconditional pleas for the first time on appeal.5
See id; Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1067.
In sum, defendant waived his claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel when he voluntarily entered his pleas and did not condition them upon being able
to appeal that issue. Also, defendant may not attack his pleas for the first time on appeal
because he has never filed a motion to withdraw his plea.
B. Defendant's claim also fails on the merits.
Even if defendant's claim were properly before the Court, it is wholly without merit.
The record is quite clear that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and
voluntary.

specifically conditioned upon his right to do so (R.135:75, 79-86). State v. Montoya, 887
P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1994); Sery, 758 P.2d at 938-39. However, as stated, defendant has
not raised that issue on appeal. Defendant's guilty pleas are unconditional with respect to
all other issues.
5

It is now too late for defendant to file a motion to withdraw his pleas. Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(b) (1995) requires that a motion to withdraw a plea be made within 30
days of the date the plea was entered. This Court has held that the 30-day limitation
period is jurisdictional so long as the defendant has been informed of it. State v. Price,
837 P.2d 578, 583 (Utah App. 1992). Here, the trial court orally informed defendant of
this limitation period before it accepted his pleas (R. 135:82). Under these circumstances,
defendant may only attack his pleas in a collateral proceeding, and even then he must
overcome procedural bars. Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d at 343-44; Lancaster v. Cook, 753
P.2d 505, 506 (Utah 1988).
12

Before taking a waiver of the right to counsel, a trial court must first advise a
defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, "so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." State v.
Beaton, 958 P.2d 911,918 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see also State v. Frampton, 111
P.2dl83, 187-88 (Utah 1987).
In addition, the trial court should (X) advise the defendant of his constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent
himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity
to understand and appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent
himself, including the expectation that the defendant will comply with
technical rules...; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature
of the charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918. The preferred method for determining the validity of a waiver of
counsel is a colloquy on the record between the court and the defendant. Id.; Frampton, 737
P.2dat 187.
The trial court in this case performed a thorough colloquy in which it advised
defendant of all the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation (R. 134:39-44; Add. B).
It then found that defendant was aware of the dangers of self-representation and that he had
the capacity to make that choice (R.l34:43-44;Add. B). Defendant does not deny this, nor
does he assert that he did not in fact make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to
counsel. Br. Aplt. 8-9. Rather, he only asserts that the trial court did not ascertain that he
comprehended the nature of the charges and proceedings and the range of possible penalties.
Br. Aplt. 8.
13

The record does not support defendant's claim. The colloquy clearly demonstrates
that defendant understood the nature of the charges and the disadvantages of selfrepresentation (R. 134:39-44). In addition, the same judge who took the waiver of counsel
had already conducted several hearings in which the charges and the range of possible
penalties were read and explained to defendant (R.2161:40-41, 90-92;R.2382:7, 9, 10,
R.134:4-5, 13-14). There was therefore no need for the judge to inform defendant of the
range of permissible penalties at the waiver of counsel hearing. Defendant also sat through
a preliminary hearing on the drug charges and on the forgery charges in the second
information (R.2382:9;R.2161:90-92). The trial court therefore properly found, based its
thorough, searching colloquy and its prior interactions with defendant, that defendant was
well aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and that his waiver of
counsel was knowing and voluntary (R. 135:43-44).
Moreover, despite defendant's claims to the contrary, the transcript to the plea hearing
demonstrates that defendant in fact had the full assistance of counsel both in negotiating and
in entering his pleas. Just as the trial court was setting defendant's matters for trial, the
parties requested a short recess so that public defendant Michael Boyle could speak to
defendant (R. 135:74). Afterwards, Mr. Boyle represented to the court that they had reached
an agreement and then stated that agreement on the record (R. 135:74-75). Although Boyle
stated that he was only "guiding" defendant through the process, he personally explained the
plea agreement to the court in detail, including that the plea to possession of a controlled
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substance was a conditional one under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Also,
when it came time to enter his plea, defendant turned to Boyle and asked him what he should
say (R. 135:86). The foregoing indicates that it was Boyle, and not defendant acting pro se,
who negotiated the agreement with the prosecutor. It also shows that Boyle fully represented
defendant during the plea-taking hearing.
To the extent that defendant also claims that he was denied the assistance of counsel
at sentencing, that claim is also not supported in the record. There is no transcript of the
sentencing hearing as the recording of that hearing could not be found. See Addendum C.
The minute entries to the sentencing hearing, however, show that a PDA attorney was present
with defendant at sentencing (R.2382:135;R.2161:116). Defendant has not pointed to any
evidence in the record that defendant was not in fact represented at sentencing. Br. Aplt. 8-9.
Absent such record evidence, defendant has not shown that he was unfairly denied his right
to counsel at sentencing. See State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (appellate court
cannot rule on question which depends for its existence on alleged facts not supported by
record); State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) (failure to provide
adequate record on appeal results in appellate court's presuming correctness of trial court's
ruling or regularity of proceedings below).6
6

While it is true that there is no transcript of the sentencing hearing because of an
inability to locate the audiotape of the proceedings, defendant had the option of
demonstrating that he was not represented at the sentencing hearing by moving to
supplement the record under rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Although this
option was explained to defendant in a letter from this Court (Add. C), he apparently
chose not to use it.
15

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not request
that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
/ST
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J ^ f d a y of <TuJ&l

1999.

JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

!#Jw.'<a^4B. DUPAIX
'ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUM A
Order Consolidating Appeals

FILED

AT ORNEY GENERAL

MAR 1 1 1999

MAR I I 1999
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo

State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case Nos. 981545-CA
981546-CA

v.
Andrew Hales,
Defendant and Appellant

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion,
filed February 17, 1999, to consolidate the above-captioned
appeals. Appellee stipulated to the motion.
It appears that judicial economy will result by
consolidating the appeals for a single decermination. Now,
therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned appeals
are consolidated as State v. Hales, case number 981545-CA.
Appellant's brief is due thirty days from the date hereof.
Dated this

fj

day of March, 1999.

FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

ADDENDUM B
Transcript of June 17,1998 Pretrial Hearing
containing Defendant's Waiver of Counsel

1
2

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT

3

WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4
5

Plaintiff,

6
7

) HEARING

STATE OP UTAH,

) Case No. 971902161
Appeal #981545

VS •

8

ANDREW JAMES HALES,

9

Defendant.

) Hon. W. Brent West
)

10
11
12

BE IT REMEMBERED

that on the 17th day of June,

13

1998 this matter came on regularly for hearing

14

before the above-named court.

15

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and

16

represented by counsel, the following proceedings

17

were held:

18
A P P E A R A N C E S
19
FOR THE STATE:
20
21
22
23
24
25

LASZIO DAROCAI, ESQ.
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., #224
OGDEN UT 84401
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
JAMES M. RETALLICK(?), ESQ.
WEBER CO. PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOC
2568 WASHINGTON BLVD., #203
OGDEN UT 844 01
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER
PAGE 3 6

1

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2

(June 17th, 1998) .

3

MR. RETALLICK?:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

MR. RETALLICK?:

6

If we'll call Mr. Hales.

Okay.
It starts number 57 on

the calendar.

7

THE CLERK:

State of Utah versus Andrew

8

James Hales, case number 971902161.

9

number 971902382.

10
11

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Also case

Has this been

resolved?

12

MR. RETALLICK?:

No, it hasn't, Your

13

Honor.

14

and I talked Friday on the telephone and he

15

indicated that he would reluctantly take a plea

16

negotiation that the State had offered which I felt

17

was a very good plea negotiation.

18

the court to inform the court of that, I informed

19

the county attorney's office of that and we called

20

off the jury.

21

I thought it had been resolved.

Mr. Hales

I came over to

And then when I get back to my office my

22

secretary says Mr. Hales had called and he wants to

23

go to trial.

24

him what the plea negotiation was in writing.

25

matter of fact I prepared a plea, a statement in

I met with Mr. Hales and presented to
As a
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1

advance of plea.

2

review that and talk to me this morning.

3

came over and talk to Mr. Hales he indicates his

4

desire to go to trial.

5

sign, put together a writing, I want to put

6

together a writing and have you sign it stating

7

that you're doing this against my express

8

instructions because I believe that this is in your

9

best interest.

10

And Mr. Hales, I asked him to
When I

I said I would like you to

And he indicates to me now that he

would like to represent himself on these charges.

11

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Well let's back

12

up.

13

on the 15th that we passed the trial.

14

thought that was ironclad.

15

I thought there was a negotiation on the one

MR. RETALLICK?:

16

Mr. Hales over the phone.

17

would accept that.

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. RETALLICK?:

Was that, I

Well, I talked to
He told me yes, he

Okay.
And, and then after I

20

went to the county attorney's office and came over

21

to the court, I got back to my office a little

22

after 5:00 and my secretary said Mr. Hales had

23

called and, and said no, he wanted to go to trial.

24

THE JUDGE:

25

So is that correct,

Mr. Hales?
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER

II

PAGE 3 8

1

THE DEPENDANT:

2

THE JUDGE:

3

represent yourself?

Yes.

And it's your intention to

4

THE DEFENDANT:

5

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

You understand that you are

6

entitled to have an attorney.

7

your attorney though have reached a crossroads

8

where you don't necessarily agree on how this case

9

should proceed in the future.

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE JUDGE:

Apparently you and

Is that correct?

Correct.

And you have decided now

12

today voluntarily and in open court that you intend

13

to waive your right to have an attorney.

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

yourself.

17

you have?

18
19

Tell me a little bit about

What kind of educational background do

THE DEFENDANT:
diploma

20

Correct.

I got a GED high school

(short inaudible) .
THE JUDGE:

Have you had any kind of

21

involvement in representing yourself in the law

22

before?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

MR. RETALLICK?:

25

add to that.

No.
Your Honor, if I might

Mr. Hales and I talked several
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1

times.

2

case law, we've discussed different aspects of the

3

case law.

4

a, I was unaware he filed a 120 day notice or

5

disposition notice-We're going to deal with that

today as well.
MR. RETALLICK?:

8
9

He's brought in statutes and he's filed

THE JUDGE:

6
7

He's brought in case law, we've discussed

And, and so I quite

frankly, Your Honor, I've been impressed with

10

Mr. Hales' level of intelligence and his ability to

11

discuss these things intelligently and have a grasp

12

of the issues.

13

eye on the strength and relative abilities as far

14

as the State's, strength of the State's case so...

It's just that we don't see eye to

THE JUDGE:

15

Okay.

So I guess what

16

you're saying is for the record you would concur

17

with the inquiry that I'm now required to make--

18

MR. RETALLICK?:

Yes, Your Honor.

19

THE JUDGE:

in regards to whether or

--

20

not a defendant can, in fact should represent

21

themselves or have the ability to represent

22

themselves.
MR. RETALLICK?:

23
24
25

That's correct, Your

Honor
THE JUDGE:

And you're of the opinion as
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1

is counsel over the period of time that you think

2

that he is adequately or capable of representing

3

himself.

Is that correct?

4

MR. RETALLICK?:

5

THE JUDGE:

6

MR. RETALLICK?:

7

10
11
12
13
14

All right.
He's done, like I say

he's done the case law research and--

8
9

Yes, Your Honor.

THE JUDGE:

Does the State have a

position?
MR. DAROCZI:

Well, I think in light of

the, there's a new case that came down.
THE JUDGE:

Yes, it's on my desk.

I've

got to make the inquiry.
MR. DAROCZI:

There's a colloquy that the

15

Court needs to go through with, with him and I

16

think that sets out the steps.

17

THE JUDGE:

Deputy Lobato, I'll never

18

tell you where it is so we'll take a short recess

19

and I'll go get it myself.

20

I'll be right back.

I know where it's at.

21

(Short break)

22

(Court called to order)

23

THE JUDGE:

All right.

I found it.

24

State versus Heaton.

25

That's a case that I preliminary, I held the

It's

I'm familiar with that case.
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1

preliminary hearing and I believe Judge Glasmann

2

tried it.

3

A couple of things.

Mr. Hales we've,

4

we've made the threshold as to your ability to

5

represent yourself and your decision to knowingly

6

and voluntarily represent yourself in this

7

particular situation and waive your right to an

8

attorney.

9

dangers and disadvantages of self-representation?

You understand that there are certain

10

THE DEFENDANT:

11

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

You understand that you are

12

not law trained and there may very well be

13

procedural matters, strategic matters and legal

14

matters with which you might not be cognizant of or

15

quite frankly oblivious of or not be aware of and

16

that the fact that you choose to represent yourself

17

that you will be treated as if, you know, you are

18

any other lawyer.

19

In other words, the Court

I] doesn't treat you differently or hold you to a

20 || different standard simply because as a layman you
21 || choose to represent yourself.

You will be held to

22 || the same standard that I would hold any other
23 || attorney to.

You understand that?

24

THE DEFENDANT:

25 ||

MR. RETALLICK?:

Okay.
Your Honor, if I might.
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1 ||

THE JUDGE:

2

MR. RETALLICK?:

((

Yes.
There

is

also

one

3

additional thing I would like to place on the

4

record that the County has informed us that they

5

have other charges, other forgeries that they are

6

considering on filing and that they most likely

7

will do so if Mr. Hales continues to push all

8

matters to trial.

9

would just like to notify the Court and Mr. Hales

And so the public defenders

10

that he would also be expected to represent himself

11

on those, that he can't bring us in for some and

12

dismiss us on the others.

13

THE JUDGE:

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE JUDGE:

And that's our concern.

You understand that?
Sure.

All right.

You've thought

16

about this, you are aware of the dangers, you've

17

been warned about it.

18

have the capacity intellectually and otherwise to

19

choose to represent yourself.

20

considerable legal research in here and I'm

21

inclined to allow you to proceed pro se but you are

22

fully cognizant and aware of that?

It appears to me that you

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

You have done

Yes.

And you are telling me now

here in open court that you are knowingly and
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1

voluntarily waiving your right to counsel.

2

correct?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE JUDGE:

Is that

Yes.

All right.

Well then with

5

that the Court will make a finding that that waiver

6

is appropriate and you may proceed pro se.

7

Next matter, I received a copy of a letter

8

that you sent to Paula Carr, clerk of court.

You

9

needed to know how much it cost to have the hearing

10

of March 4th, tape 304, count 1051 transcribed and

11

so that you might make arrangements to have it done

12

or paid for on the outside.

13

to inform you that the cost of the tape is $15.

14

It will be $3 postage unless someone comes down and

15

picks it up.

16

upon which transcriber you go to.

17

transcribe it from the video to the written.

18

depends upon who you hire.

19

charge different rates all within a range.

Ms. Carr advised me

And the cost of transcription depends

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

THE JUDGE:

I mean they
It

Different transcribers

Okay.

So if you intend simply to

22

have a copy of the tape that's $15 plus $3

23

postage.

24

writing she said it would depend upon who you had

25

to transcribe it and you would have to deal with

If you intend to reduce it down to
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P.O. Box 140230
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FAX (801) 578-3999
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Marilyn M. Branch
Appellate Court Administrator
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

November 30,1998

Randine Salerno
Public Defender Association, Inc.
of Weber County
2568 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

State v. Andrew Hales
CaseNo.981545-CA

Dear Ms. Salerno:
On November 27, 1998, this court received notification from Penny Abbott, CSR, that the
transcripts were filed in the trial court on November 24, 1998. Ms. Abbott also indicated in the
notification that a transcript of two requested dates were not available. The 5/27/97 plea hearing
is apparently not available because "the clerks notes indicate that no hearing was held." The
8/5/98 transcript of the sentencing hearing is not available because the tape could not be found.
A copy of Ms. Abbott's notification is enclosed herewith because it does not appear that a copy
was forwarded to you. Because not all transcripts that you requested are available, please advise
this court within 14 daysfromthe date hereof if you intend to proceed with the available
transcripts or if you intend to pursue other remedies under Rule 11, Utah R. App. P., as to the
transcripts that are unavailable.

[ATI

Yours truly,
/

L

"^pp|srlJ

Ene.
cc:
Christine Soltis, Assistant AttcDrney General

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

